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ABSTRACT
This investigation was undertaken in order to determine 
the nature of nationalist reaction to the Dawes Plan in 
Germany. The representative nationalist political party in 
Germany, the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP), provided 
the vehicle by which this reaction could be measured. Thus 
a careful study was conducted of this party's statements 
both during parliamentary debate and in the press.
The results of the investigation revealed that Party 
unity was lacking on the critical Dawes Plan issue. While 
all delegates adhered to a nationalist line, thus attempting 
by their vote for or against to promote the future welfare 
of Germany, each delegate had his own perception of 
Germany's best interests that determined his voting 
behavior.
Such inability to unite on critical issues was detri­
mental to the future of the DNVP as a force in German poli­
tics and played a role in opening the door to nationalist 
extremism in the latter nineteen-twenties and early 
nineteen-thi rties.
THE DEUTSCHNATIONALE VOLKSPARTEI AND THE DAWES PLAN
1923-1924
INTRODUCTION
World War One and its aftermath provide historians of 
European history with a myriad of fascinating and complex 
problems. Within Europe itself, for example, both victor 
and defeated nations found themselves faced with a situation 
unparalleled in their previous experiences. The emergence 
of Communism as a political force, the effects of a shat­
tered world economic and financial system, and the massive 
reconstruction required by the devastation of technological 
and mechanized warfare were but a few of the problems that 
confronted politicians of these nations. But the most 
pressing problem in 1918 was the need to reintegrate the 
European community and to create safeguards against the 
recurrence of war on such a vast scale.
The Treaty of Versailles was the result of an attempt 
to solve this dual problem, yet in fact it created addi­
tional problems for the peacemakers. The settlement was 
harsh, a measure deemed necessary by the victor nations in 
order to preserve the peace. To justify such severe terms, 
it was imperative that the responsibility for the World War 
rest upon the shoulders of the defeated nations, primarily 
upon Germany. Here lay the foundation upon which Article 
231, the infamous "war guilt" clause, rested.
2
3In addition, Article 234 established the concept of 
reparations and provided for the creation of an Allied Repa­
ration Commission to oversee payment and adjudicate disputes 
between Germany and her creditors. These measures also drew 
their justification from Germany's "moral responsibility" 
for the World War and could hardly fail to become political 
issues within Germany herself.
By 1922, however, post-war inflation and the demands 
made on the German economy by reparation payments were prov­
ing disastrous. By the end of 1923, following the French 
seizure of the Ruhr and the resultant policy of passive 
resistance, the German economy was at a standstill. The 
story of the Deutschnationale Volkspartei and the Dawes 
Plan, therefore, is the story of one German political fac­
tion's response to the economic consequences of the peace 
and to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles that 
created such consequences. To the members of the Deutsch- 
nationale Volkspartei, the Dawes Plan was but an attempt to 
continue the anti-German "system of power" established at 
Versailles, even though their response to the Plan was not 
entirely negative.
No literature has been published that specifically con­
cerns the Party's response to the Dawes Plan, although two 
studies, one cited in the bibliography of this paper and one 
a doctoral dissertation presented to a German university, 
deal with the Party itself on a broader#scale. It is hoped 
therefore, that this project, which merely scratches the
4surface, will open the door to future research into a prob 
lem that played a significant role in the course of German 
history.
CHAPTER I
THE COMMITTEE AND THE PLAN
On the thirtieth of November 1923, the governments of 
the victorious allied powers agreed to the formation of two 
committees of experts whose major task would be to investi­
gate Germany's capacity to meet her reparation obligations. 
The precedent for such committees was that established in 
November of 1922 when an international committee of experts 
gathered in Berlin to investigate the problem of stabilizing 
the rapidly inflating German Mark. The problem of inflation 
had remained unsolved, however, bringing not only the French 
occupation of the Ruhr and German passive resistance in its 
wake, but Germany's increasing inability and unwillingness 
to pay reparations.
On the tenth of October, 1923, American President 
Calvin Coolidge had called for an international committee of 
financial experts to examine and find a solution to the dual 
problem of reparations and German economic recovery. Five 
days later, American Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes 
had indicated to the British Government that ". . . compe­
tent American citizens would be willing to participate in an 
economic inquiry . . • through an advisory body appointed by
5
6the Reparation Commission."! Hughes' statement led on the 
thirtieth of November, to a Reparation Commission declara­
tion that:
In order to consider, in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 234 of the Treaty of 
Versailles, the resources and capacity of Germany 
and after giving her representatives a just oppor­
tunity to be heard, the Reparation Commission [has] 
decided to create two committees of experts belong­
ing to the Allied and Associated c o u n t r i e s . 2
In this way the Dawes Committee, named after its American 
Chairman, Charles G. Dawes, came into being on the four­
teenth of January, 1924.
The Dawes Committee radiated technical competence.
Dawes himself was Chairman of the Board of the Central Trust 
Company of Illinois. The Chairman of the subcommittee on 
currency stabilization, the American Owen D. Young, was a 
Director of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as well as 
a member of the Board of Directors of General Electric and 
the Radio Corporation of America. One of the British dele­
gates, Sir Robert Kindersley, sat as a Director of the Bank 
of England while the other. Sir Josiah Stamp, was a renowned 
economist. Similarly qualified individuals rounded out
^-Charles Evans Hughes, quoted in George P. Auld,
The Dawes Plan and the New Economics (New York: Doubleday,
Page, and Company, 1927), p. 69. (Hereinafter cited as The 
Dawes Plan) . For a brief explanation of the Reparation Com- 
mision, see the introduction to this thesis.
^Declaration of the Reparation Commission, November 
30, 1923, quoted in The Dawes Plan, p. 71. The relevant 
articles of the Treaty of Versailles are briefly discussed 
in the introduction.
7Young's subcommittee and constituted a second subcommittee 
on balancing the German budget under the direction of 
Stamp.3
The Dawes Committee rendered its findings in a written 
report addressed to the Reparation Commission on the ninth 
of April, 1924. It took great care to emphasize the apolit­
ical nature of its recommendations by underscoring the motto 
of "business" rather than politics. Further, it sought the 
recovery of "debt" rather than the imposition of penalties, 
holding Germany's "debt" as a "necessary contribution to re­
pairing the damage of the war."4
The technical provisions of the report, popularly known 
as the Dawes Plan by August, 1924, concerned the following 
points:
1. The burden to be assumed by industry in the financ­
ing of the reparations debt
2. The state budget, its organization, and its role as 
a source of reparations revenue
3. The nature and operation of the Reichsbank
4. The establishment of a private note bank
5. The nature and operation of the Reichsbahn and its 
potential as a source of reparations revenue^
With these provisions, the Dawes Committee hoped to
^The rest of the members were as follows: France:
Monsieur Parmentier, Professor Allix; Italy: Signor
Pirelli, Professor Flora; Belgium: Monsieur Franqui, Baron
Houtart. (The Dawes Plan, 118-119).
^For the basis of the Committee's attitude see the 
German Parliamentary Debates, vol. 382, Nr. 5, vii-xiii. 
Germany's "necessary contribution" was morally derived and 
easily justified if one accepts Article 231 of the Treaty of 
Versailles, the "war guilt" clause.
^For a summary of the Committee's recommendations 
see Ibid.
8establish a stable German economy that would serve as a 
realistic and reliable basis from which Germany might make 
reparation payments to the allied powers,
German industry was asked to assume industrial deben­
tures totalling five billion Gold Marks and bearing five 
percent interest per annum by taking a first mortgage on 
industrial plant and property. In terms of 1914 dollars, 
the Dawes Committee, therefore, asked that Germany take a 
first mortgage on the nation’s industrial plant amounting to 
1,190,4N76,190 dollars. A trustee, appointed by the Repara­
tion Commission, was to hold the debentures, handle 
receipts, and collect payments. The German Government would 
be liable for any defaulted payments.6
It was envisioned that an organizational committee 
would be established to oversee the recommended mortgaging 
of German industry. Its membership was to consist of one 
representative from German industry, two representatives 
appointed by the Reparation Commission, and a fifth neutral 
national agreeable to the other four members. If these four 
members reached no agreement on this fifth appointee, he was 
to be named by the Reparation Commission.7
It was further envisioned that state revenues were to 
serve as an additional source of reparations payments.
6see the Dawes Committee report and summary printed 
in the German Parliamentary Debates, vol. 382, Nr. 5, vii 
ff . (Hereinafter cited as Report, G.P.D.).
7ibid.
9Toward this end, the Dawes Committee sought to balance the 
German federal budget so as to generate a surplus that could 
be used for the liquidation of Germany's reparation obliga­
tions. It was hoped that a one-year moratorium on repara­
tion charges would bring about fiscal conditions necessary 
for a balanced budget. Thereafter, the Dawes Committee 
called for the application of the commensurate taxation 
principle to insure future capital for reparations.8
The Dawes Committee also recommended a fundamental 
reconstruction of the Reichsbank, a recommendation which 
reflected the general apprehension raised abroad by the 
catastrophic German fiscal collapse of 1923. It envisioned 
that the new bank would be a private corporation with a 
charter to last for fifty years. After the sale of a speci­
fied initial number of shares, remaining shares would be 
allowed to float on the international m a r k e t . 9
The activities of the proposed Reichsbank, however, 
were to be strictly limited (both as a credit institution 
and as a bank of issue). Proposals governing the relation­
ship between the Reichsbank and the state were especially 
stringent. For one thing, the bank was to retain complete
^See Report, G.P.D. Commensurate taxation involved 
two principles. The Dawes Committee considered Germany's 
internal debt liquidated by the inflation of 1923, thus ren­
dering the German Government free from internal obligations. 
Therefore, new debt charges should be raised commensurate 
with those levied against the French, English, Italian, and 
Belgian taxpayers.
9lbid.
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independence from the state. For another, the bank would be 
requested to limit its advances to the German federal gov­
ernment in order to avoid a repetition of the disastrous 
fiscal collapse of 1923-24.10 For example, issues to 
the Reich would amount to no more than 100 million Marks, or 
any portion of all previous issues falling short of that 
figure.11 Such issues would be limited to a maturation 
period of three months; all government debts held by the 
bank must be cleared prior to the end of the fiscal 
year.12
The proposed Reichsbank was to have the sole authority 
to issue notes.1^ One form of existing tender, the 
Rentenmark, would be withdrawn from circulation altogether. 
The old Reichsmarks would be redeemable at an exchange rate 
of one billion to every new Gold Mark. Naturally, the new 
issue was to rest on the gold standard.1^
Finally, the Dawes Committee proposed that this Reichs­
bank be capitalized by a foreign loan amounting to 400 mil­
lion Gold Marks. It was also envisioned that the Reichsbank
wo uld act as a depository for reparation payments.I5
l°See Report, G.P.D. , summary and 83-97.
11Ibid.
12ibid.
1^ibid. The State Banks of Baden, Bavaria, Saxony 
and Wurtemberg also retained this authority.
14ibid.
1Sibid.
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The Dawes Committee proposed that a General Board 
should supervise the activities of the Reichsbank through a 
Managing Executive Board and President. The General Board 
was to include seven German and seven non-German members, of 
which one, designated as the "Commissioner," would have 
supervisory responsibility for paper issue and the mainten­
ance of the reserve. All members of the General Board would 
serve independent of their respective governments.^
Proposals concerning the nature and operation of the 
Reichsbahn (German National Railway), however, formed the 
core of the Dawes Report because these, unlike the others, 
required a change in the German Constitution.1^
The Dawes Committee based its findings on a report sub­
mitted to it by two allied railway experts (British and 
French, respectively), Sir William Acworth and Monsieur 
Leverve.18 Acworth and Leverve had been concerned with 
the revenue-producing capability of the Reichsbahn and with 
its utility as a source for reparations revenue. They had 
concluded that the railroad could be "most easily utilized"
18See Report, G.P.D., summary and 85-88. The non- 
German nationals on the General Board represented the coun­
tries of Belgium, France, England, America, Italy, Holland, 
and S w i t z e r l a n d D e c i s i o n s  required, in most cases, a 
majority of ten.
!7see Chapter Two. Constitutional changes required 
a two-thirds majority in the German Parliament; thus the 
Re ichsbahn proposals represented the fulcrum upon which the 
entire Dawes Plan rested.
18See Report, G.P.D., 101-123.
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for reparation payments.19 Their report indicated an 
expected net annual revenue of one billion Gold Marks.20
To achieve its projected income, however, the Reichs- 
bahn would have to be operated more efficiently. Currently, 
the report declared, gross receipts did not cover expendi­
tures, " . . .  operating expenses were unduly high, staff 
• • . unnecessarily large, and magnificent stations and 
enormous shunting yards were being worked at great ex­
pense."21 Acworth and Leverve recommended staff reductions, 
higher tariffs, and a more efficient operation to increase 
economy and curtail expenditure.22 More importantly, how­
ever, they concluded that foreign controls were necessary in 
order to insure the implementation of their recommendations:
It is therefore indispensable to make a radical 
change in the policy followed by the railways hith­
erto. But we do not believe that any German manage­
ment will have the strength necessary to fight suc­
cessfully against the traditional mental attitude, 
unless there is behind it the constant pressure of 
an expert control, established and maintained in the 
interests of the Allies, to supervise the management 
in the matter both of tariffs and expenditure . . . .
We think that a commercially managed railway company 
ought to treat the attainment of an adequate net 
revenue as of primary importance . . .  .23
Acworth's and Leverve's views served as a rationale for
the Dawes Committee to disregard the paternalistic services
19Report, G.P.D., 101.
20Ibid., 102-104.
21Ibid., 104.
22Ibid., 105-107.
23Ibid., 109.
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traditionally provided by the Reichsbahn under government 
sponsorship. It recommended, therefore, that the German 
railway system be transformed into a profit-oriented commer­
cial concern so as to yield the necessary surplus revenue 
for reparation payments. Agreeing with Acworth and Leverve 
that the Reichsbahn represented the best potential source of 
reparation revenues, the Dawes Committee suggested a total 
capitalization of 26 billion Gold Marks, of which two bil­
lion would be in the form of preference shares, 11 billion 
in the form of first mortgage bonds, and 13 billion in the 
form of common shares held by the German government.24 in 
so recommending, the Committee sought an initial capitaliza­
tion figure that would insure the net annual revenue figure 
projected by Acworth and Leverve.
As in the case with the system of industrial deben­
tures, an organization committee was to be formed that would 
oversee the execution of the Committee*s proposals concern­
ing the Reichsbahn. Its expenses charged to the Reichsbahn, 
the organization committee would consist of two delegates 
appointed by the German Minister of Railways, Acworth and 
Leverve or their nominees, and a fifth member of neutral 
nationality, chosen by the other four or, in the event of 
deadlock, appointed by the Reparation C o m m i s s i o n . 25 its 
task would be completed upon the execution of the proposals,
24Report, G.P.D., 124-125.
25jbid., Annex IV.
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the establishment of an independent railway company, and the 
appointment of its Commissioner. Appointed by a majority 
vote of the foreign members of the Board of Directors, the 
Railway Commissioner would exercise extensive powers of in­
spection and supervision in view of his function as protec­
tor of allied interests in the revenue generated by the 
transformed railway operations. For example:
If any measure in connection with construction, oper­
ation, or tariffs tends substantially to menace the 
rights or interests of the bondholders or of the 
Reparation Commission . . . and in particular the pay­
ment due dates [of reparation contributions] . . . .  
he shall discuss the question with the General Manag­
er. If he cannot persuade the latter to change his 
line of conduct, he must lay the question before the 
managing b o a r d . 26
If, however, the Reichsbahn should actually fail to produce 
sufficient revenue to cover its reparation obligations, the 
Railway Commissioner would then be empowered to dispose of 
property, "operate, lease, or otherwise dispose of in agree­
ment with the Trustee for bonds, all capital subject to bond 
c h a r g e s . " 2 7  The Commissioner and his staff would be 
paid from Reichsbahn proceeds.2**
Detailed proposals were also offered concerning the 
administration and management of the transformed Reichsbahn 
itself. The Board of Directors would consist of at least 
eighteen men, all well known for their experience and
26Report, G.P.D., 128.
27Ibid., 129 
28jbid.
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expertise in railroad operations. The German government 
would appoint nine directors, while the other nine would be 
appointed by a trustee, appointed in turn by the Reparation 
Commission. Of the nine directors appointed by the German 
government, four would be subject to subsequent election by 
the preference shareholders. These elected directors then 
would form a pool of candidates for the Board chairmanship.
A general manager, responsible to the Railway Commissioner, 
would be of German nationality.29
Thus the transformed Reichsbahn, the revised federal 
budget, and the industrial debentures were seen as primary 
sources of reparation revenues. The Committee report, 
therefore, included recommendations concerning the transfer 
and scheduling of reparation payments, recommendations that 
brought the three sources together at the focal point of the 
Reichsbank for the collection and transfer of such payments.
It was further envisioned that an additional allied 
control would serve to insure the collection and availabil­
ity of reparation revenues. This control, a Transfer Com­
mittee made up of non-German foreign exchange experts, would 
be responsible for the conversion of German Marks into the 
foreign currency necessary for reparation transfers.30 
An Agent for Reparation Payments would chair the Transfer 
Committee meetings. A reparations account in the Reichsbank
29peport, G.P.D., 126-127.
S^For a discussion of the role and responsibilities of 
the Transfer Committee, see Report, G.P.D.
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in his name would act as a repository for accumulated repar­
ation revenues. The Committee's tasks would involve:
1. The application of payments from the reparations 
account in the Reichsbank for scheduled deliveries 
in kind under the Reparations Recovery Act as 
directed by the Reparation Commission
2. The periodic conversion of balances in the repara­
tions account into foreign currency, followed by 
remittance in accordance with the Reparation 
Commi ssion
3. The investment of funds from the reparations 
account in German bonds or other loans for the pur­
pose of generating additional r e v e n u e ^ l
The Transfer Committee would also be able to purchase, if
necessary, German property in order to defeat attempts by
the German government or by German industry to prevent
transfers.32
Finally, the Dawes Committee devised a schedule for the 
payment of reparations involving a yearly analysis of the 
amounts to be contributed from the federal budget and the 
amounts to be drawn from industrial debentures and Reichs­
bahn revenues. The federal budget would remain free from 
reparation payments until 1926. During 1924-1925, part of a 
proposed foreign loan totalling 800 million Gold Marks and 
interest on railway bonds would provide reparation revenues, 
while during 1925-1926, part interest on railway bonds, 
industrial debentures, and the sale of 500 million Gold 
Marks worth of railway shares would serve this purpose. The
21For a discussion of the role and responsibilities 
of the Transfer Committee, see Report, G.P.D.
3 2 i b i d .
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Dawes Committee calculated the total transferable sum for 
the period 1924-1926 at 2,220 million Gold Marks.
The next two years were designated as transition years. 
During the period 1926-1927, interest on railway bonds and 
industrial debentures would constitute part of the payment. 
In addition, for the first time, the railway transport tax 
and the federal budget would provide revenue for repar­
ations. The Dawes Committee calculated the total transfer­
able sum for this period at 1,200 million Gold Marks. The 
sources for the period 1927-1928 would remain the same as 
for the previous period. The total transferable sum for 
this period was calculated at 1,750 million Gold Marks.
The years 1928-1929 were designated as "standard
years." At this point, it was projected that revenues drawn
from the sources utilized during the two transitional years
would provide reparation payments totalling 2,500 Gold Marks 
per annum. In addition, the Reich obligation would include 
a supplementary payment based upon a sliding "index of pros­
perity," for the Dawes Committee members believed that 
Germany's creditors "must share in the improvement of 
Germany's prosperity" and felt that a sliding "index" would 
provide the means for accomplishing this.33
The statistical computation of the "index" would be 
based on several factors:
1. The total of German imports and exports
33see Report, G.P.D., summary.
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2. The total of federal budget receipts and expendi­
tures, excluding Treaty payment expenditures, but 
including the state budgets of Prussia, Bavaria, 
and Saxony
3. The total weight carried by railway traffic
4. The cash value, computed by consumer price, of 
beer, sugar, tobacco, and alcohol within Germany
5. Germany's population figure, computed from the most 
recent census, emigration records, and vital 
statistics
6. A per capita figure for coal consumption, based on 
a total figure for coal and lignite c o n s u m p t i o n . 34
The "index" computation would also require a base fig­
ure upon which to calculate prosperity increases. The three 
years 1927, 1928, and 1929 would serve as a base for federal 
budget statistics, population, and coal consumption per 
capita. An average of six years, that is, the years 1912, 
1913, 1926, 1927, 1928, and 1929 would serve as a base for 
the other factors.
In order to arrive at the actual prosperity increase, 
each factor would be separately compared to its base, the 
increase in prosperity for that factor computed, and an 
"arithmetic average" taken as the "index of prosperity” for 
any given fiscal year. Such "index figures" would then be 
applied to the fiscal years 1929-1930 and to all subsequent 
years in which reparations were due. An application of the 
index percentage to the reparations amount would yield the 
supplementary payment for any given fiscal year. The Dawes 
Committee recommended that the computations for the period 
1929-1930 through 1933-1934 be made against one-half of the 
total reparations payment due, that is, against 1,250
34see Report, G.P.D., 98.
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million Gold Marks. Subsequently, the full amount of 2,500 
million Gold Marks would be utilized. It also advised the 
referral of any difficulties concerning the index to the 
finance section of the League of N a t i o n s . 3 5
The recommendations of the Dawes Committee, which came 
to be known as the Dawes Plan, envisaged a program that it 
thought would set Germany back on her economic feet and 
thereby expedite the payment of reparations to allied credi­
tors. Yet, the final sum of Germany's reparation payments 
under the Dawes Plan would amount to approximately 37 bil­
lion Gold Marks! Germany would make the final payment in 
1949. Industrial debentures and railway bonds would be 
liquidated in 1964. Germany faced forty years of payments 
according to the calculations of the financiers and econo­
mists of the Dawes Committee.
The Dawes Plan justified itself on the basis of what 
the Committee members described as Germany's "moral obliga­
tion" to pay. Reducing the problem of reparations to the 
dual question of economics and obligations, the Committee 
members concluded that Germany, who had suffered virtually 
no material damage as a result of the World War, was obli­
gated to those allied states who had suffered materially.
Such "moral" justification for the Dawes Plan could not 
fail to antagonize the parliamentary delegates of the German 
nationalist party, the Deutschnationale Vokspartei (German
35gee Report, G.P . D ., summary and 99-100.
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National People's Party). In addition, these delegates 
opposed the Plan's recommended physical controls which con­
tradicted its promise of economic sovereignty. As noted 
above, the Reichsbank1s administration was potentially in 
the control of foreigners. The Railway Commissioner enjoyed 
far-reaching controls over the administration and operation 
of the Reichsbahn. German industrial debentures were held 
and administered by foreigners. Nationalist delegates, 
pledged to uphold the national, political, and economic sov­
ereignty of the Reich, could not tolerate what appeared to 
them to be an "enslavement" of Germany at least as severe as 
the Treaty of Versailles.
CHAPTER II
THE DEUTSCHNATIONALE VOLKSPARTEI AND THE DAWES PLAN:
THE DEBATE
During the spring and summer of 1924f the German par­
liament concerned itself with the Dawes proposals and the 
legislation necessary for their implementation. During the 
debates, the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP) parliamen­
tary delegation, supported by the Party press, represented 
Party attitudes toward the Dawes Plan. These attitudes were 
the result of several factors. To begin with, the DNVP 
delegates argued that the French occupation of the Ruhr was 
an intolerable and coercive situation which must be elimin­
ated prior to Germany's acceptance of the Dawes Committee 
proposals. In the second place, the Dawes Plan's proposed 
economic controls were felt to be incompatible with German 
sovereignty. Finally, the DNVP perceived a direct link 
between the proposed justification for the Dawes Plan and 
the detested "war guilt" clause, Article 231 of the 
Versailles Treaty.
Indeed, the Party's position on the fundamental issue 
of reparations most influenced the attitude of the DNVP 
toward the Dawes Proposals. Hence an understanding of the 
DNVP response to the Dawes Plan requires more than an exam­
ination of the debates following the introduction of the
21
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Dawes Committee proposals into parliament. it also requires 
an examination of debates that had taken place during the 
late summer and fall of 1923, concerning the general issue 
of reparations and that of the French occupation of the 
Ruhr. Only then is it possible to bring perspective to the 
D N V P 1s attitude toward the Dawes Plan.
Even as early as the ninth of August, 1923, the DNVP 
delegation leader, former Prussian Royal Finance Minister 
Oskar Hergt, heatedly attacked Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno's 
policy of passive resistance to the French occupation of the 
R u h r .  3”7 Hergt saw the French action in terms that went 
far beyond legal and economic arguments. "France tramples 
justice underfoot, France acts contrary to every Christian 
moral."38 Thus the French action and its economic results, 
Hergt argued, justified German retaliatory measures that 
should go beyond the present government policy of passive 
resistance. "What would be more to the point than that 
Germany, in her difficult material position, ceased all rep­
arations payments as well . . . ."39 well prior to the un­
veiling of the Dawes Plan, the DNVP delegation had already 
adopted a point of view that found no acceptable
37G erman Parliamentary Debates (Hereinafter cited 
as G.P.D.), vol. 361, 11780-11785.
38ibid., 11781. Italics in text. All translations 
are mine.
39ibid., 11780.
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justification for the payment of reparations as long as the 
French occupation force remained in the Ruhr.
On the twelfth of August, the failure of passive 
resistance caused the Cuno Government to resign. Policy­
making now fell into the hands of a cabinet headed by Gustav 
Stresemann. Stresemann, an experienced politician and 
leader of the German People's Party, was ready to pursue a 
pragmatic approach to reparations that reflected his evalua­
tion of the realities of the situation. The new Chancellor, 
for example, accepted the fact that Germany was physically 
incapable of ejecting the French from the Ruhr. He also 
knew that the Reich could not oppose in toto reparations; he 
understood, however, that Germans must perceive that their 
honor was upheld if a solution was to be found. By his 
remarks in parliament, Streseman indicated his hopes to find 
a compromise between the extremes of hopeless defiance and 
total surrender. The Chancellor expressed his conviction 
that:
If a free and independent jurisdiction over 
the German Ruhr is again guaranteed to us, if the 
Rhineland finds itself in conditions established by 
treaty and internationally guaranteed, . . . then we 
will . . .  be able to raise the question of methods 
for regulating the reparations problem.40
Germany's critical economic situation, however, forced
Stresemann to end passive resistance even before assuaging
German honor by receiving a guarantee of French evacuation.
On the twenty-eighth of September, 1923, a parliamentary
4QG.P.D., vol. 361, 11840.
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spokesman for the Center Party had introduced a resolution 
calling for the revival of industrial and manufacturing 
activity in the Rhine and Ruhr (die Wiedererlebung der 
industriellen und gewerblichen Tatigkeit in Rhein- und 
Ruhrgebiete) .41 The DNVP hotly picked up the guantlet thus 
thrown down by the Center and took to the offensive. DNVP 
delegate Karl Neuhaus, a manufacturer from Dusseldorf, soon 
removed the issue of passive resistance from the sphere of 
practical policy by hinting at larger more explosive issues. 
A fellow delegate subsequently revealed Neuhaus' "larger 
issue" to be Stresemann's apparent "full capitulation" to 
the French.
By October, the DNVP delegates were in concerted attack 
against the Stresemann policy regarding the French occupa­
tion. On the eighth, for example, Count von Westrap, a 
well-known Conservative and prominent member of the DNVP 
delegation, condemned the administration for the abandonment 
of passive resistance:
If it is a question of in what ways foreign 
policy can affect the recovery of our finances the 
answer is, that only can this happen through a policy 
which comes nearer to liberating us from the bondage 
of the Versailles Treaty and from the insanity of 
reparations (Reparationswahnsinn) , not through 
measures such as the laying down of our weapons, 
measures which produce the opposite result.42
In conclusion, Westarp cried out his scathing condemna­
tion of the government policy: "We reject," he said,
41G .P.D., vol. 361, 11914-11915.
42ibid., 11976.
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• . all those activities which represent yielding to the 
will of the enemy."43
By the time that the Dawes Committee came into being, 
therefore, the DNVP delegation ahd already staked out its 
opposition to the French occupation and to reparations. The 
delegates, believing the French occupation to be contrary to 
the principles of justice and morality, were not prepared to 
yield before attempts to resolve the reparations issue with­
out first receiving guarantees that the Ruhr situation would 
be rectified.
On the thirteenth of March, 1924, parliament was dis­
solved pending new elections on the fourth of May. The 
DNVP, whose campaign platform called for a rejection of the 
Dawes Plan, returned to parliament following these elections 
with a delegation of 106 members, indicating that this plat­
form enjoyed the support of a significant segment of the 
German population. Indeed, the DNVP delegation now held the 
deciding vote in constitutional matters requiring a two- 
thirds majority. Inasmuch as the Reichsbahn legislation, an 
integral part of the Dawes Plan, required a constitutional 
change, the attitudes of the DNVP delegation assumed a cru­
cial role in the subsequent debates.
On the fifth of June, 1924, a representative of the 
government coalition of Center, Democratic, and People's 
Parties advised that parliament quickly accept the Dawes
43G.P.D., vol. 361, 11979.
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Committee report. He based his request on Germany's dis­
tressed economic condition, the situation in the occupied 
areas, the need to rapidly settle the reparations issue, and 
the need to obtain the foreign economic credit and confi­
dence necessary for economic recovery.^
The government coalition's timing in introducing the 
Dawes Committee report made its acceptance an issue of con­
fidence. Count von Westarp, answering on behalf of the 
DNVP, began the Party's attack by pointing out the implica­
tions of the government's request. Accepting the Dawes Com­
mittee report involved bringing German honor into question 
and implied accepting the detested "war guilt" clause con­
tained in the Treaty of Versailles as well. In Westarp's 
opinion, all of the proposals and suggestions contained 
within the Dawes Committee report rested on this "inequity" 
and German honor demanded its rejection.
While not opposed to the idea of reparations per s e , 
Westarp questioned Germany's "moral" obligation to pay.
After all, Germany too had suffered from war damage. To 
support his argument, he listed several examples of the 
material and physical damage suffered by Germany during the 
course of the War:
1. The destruction of East Prussia as a result of 
the Russian invasion, rebuilt during the War 
at a cost of 50 billion Marks
2. The loss of important life-supporting (leben- 
swichtige) territories as a result of the peace 
settlement
44see the G . P . D . , session of June 5, 1924.
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3. The loss of Germany's merchant fleet and 
foreign possessions as a result of the peace 
settlement
4. The privation of women and children caused 
by the British blockade during the War
These facts required that every German and every foreign
representative of German interests must oppose the principle
that Germany pay because she had suffered least!
Westarp then maintained that the French occupation of 
the Ruhr represented an outrage against justice and morality 
and stated several conditions upon which the DNVP delega­
tion's willingness to discuss the Dawes Plan would be con­
tingent. He demanded the political, military, and economic 
liberation of the Ruhr, as well as a return to Treaty condi­
tions in the occupied Rhineland. He called for the release 
of political prisoners in the occupied areas and the return 
of those Germans expelled by the occupation authorities. He 
also demanded guarantees of freedom from future encroach­
ments by the "French security firm."
However, Westarp concluded, even if his conditions were 
met, the government's acceptance of the Dawes Committee 
report in its present form was out of the question. He 
emphasized that the report could do no more than form a 
basis for discussion. In no case could it be considered a 
finished product to be agreed upon. Only after discussion, 
revisions, amendments, and the formulation of legislation 
should the government consider accepting the Dawes Plan as a
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basis for further discussion on questions of economic recov­
ery and reparations.45
Delegate Hans Schlange from Pomerania also spoke out 
against the Dawes Committee report on the ninth of June.
He, too, linked, as Westarp had done, the report to the "war 
guilt" clause. "I repeat the statement, that we demand the 
joint consideration and discussion of the war guilt question 
and the Committee proposals. During the course of such dis­
cussions, Germany's innocence concerning the responsibility 
for the War must be reiterated again and a g a i n . "46
Schlange continued to insist, however, that the DNVP 
delegation did not seek a complete rejection of the Dawes 
proposals. Adhering to Westarp's position, he repeated the 
delegation's conditional demand. "If we have assurances 
that the Rhine and Ruhr will be liberated, a certain eco­
nomic price can be p a i d . " 4 7  i n  addition, Schlange advanced 
concrete reasons for this position. He stated his belief 
that the government's unconditional acceptance of the Dawes 
Committee proposals would only create a situation in which 
France would look for further violations in the occupied 
areas in order to maintain her position there.
In conclusion, Schlange demanded a more aggressive 
policy than had been pursued previously. He spoke of
45For Westarp's speech, see the G . P . D ., vol. 381, 
108-117.
46g .P.D., vol. 381, 178.
4 7ibid., 180.
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warning the "enemy" not to go too far (Treibt es nicht zu weit 
. . .) and noted that a country of 60 million people could 
not be forced to sign its own death warrant (Todesurteil).48 
While the Dawes Plan controversy raged in parliament, 
DNVP delegates and their sympathizers were also busy present­
ing the Party point of view to the general public through 
the Party press. Such publications as the Neue Preussische 
Kreuz-Zeitung and the Deutschnationale FIugschriften abound­
ed with articles which attempted to support the delegation's 
position during the Dawes Plan debates.
The Party press contained articles dealing with all 
aspects of the Dawes Plan. For example, the Dawes Committee 
had stated that their proposals represented a business, 
"apolitical" solution to Germany's economic problems. Doc­
tor Karl Helfferich, noted German economist and one of the 
Party's more outspoken members, argued forcefully against 
such a contention in his pamphlet "The Second Versailles," 
part of a series of pamphlets entitled the Deutschnationale 
Flugschr i ften.49
Helfferich pointed out the fantasy of believing that 
the Dawes Committee report avoided political questions and, 
more significantly, expressed his fear of French machina­
tions behind the scenes.
48G .P.D., vol. 381, 181.
49peutschnationale Flugschriften were published by 
the DNVP publication office in Berlin throughout the Weimar 
Republic years and will hereinafter be referred to as the 
D.F.
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Poincare has already clearly declared that he 
will uphold the occupation of the Ruhr, even if the 
[Dawes Committee] experts' proposals are accepted, 
until Germany has paid the full amount [of repara­
tions], therefore until eternity, or until the time 
when France is forced to evacuate. Naturally, this 
decision signifies as well a decision to uphold the 
occupation of the Rhineland beyond the time period 
envisaged in the Versailles Diktat.50
Doctor Wilhelm Reichert, DNVP delegate and co-author of 
"The Second Versailles," expressed the same sentiments in a 
much more bitter tone: "Actually Poincare is the string-
puller, who permits the expert puppets to dance according to 
his policy."51
Further evidence of this attitude is found in the pages 
of the Neue Preussische Kreuz-Zeitung, the national Conserv­
ative newspaper affiliated with the DNVP. On the twenty- 
sixth of June, 1924, for example, an editorial appeared that 
supported this line of argument. The editor emphasized that 
the evacuation of the Ruhr was a determinate factor in 
Germany's decision to accept or reject the Dawes Committee 
proposals. "What Germany demands is little. It is the re­
establishment of its rights according to the Treaty [of 
Versailles]•"52
Such arguments linked the Dawes Committee proposals 
directly to the political issue of the French occupation. 
Thus the delegates argued that a solution to this issue was
SOp. F . , Number 175, p. 9.
Sllbid., 18.
52ft[eue Preussische Kreuz-Zeitung, 26 June, 1924, 
(hereinafter referred to as the K.Z.).
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a prerequisite for accepting the subsequent Dawes Plan 
legislation. Such a solution would indeed serve as a first 
step in "depoliticizing" the Dawes Plan itself.
During the latter part of July, the members of parlia­
ment waited expectantly for news from London, where an 
international conference was transforming the Dawes Commit­
tee report into its final form. As the tension mounted, the 
DNVP delegation tended to raise the question of the Dawes 
Committee proposals more often. This question even found 
its way into parliamentary discussions concerning unrelated 
topics.
On the twenty-fourth of July, delegate Gustav Hartz, 
referring to parliamentary committee reports concerning 
social insurance and injury compensation, noted that the 
obligations contained within the Dawes Committee report 
represented a terrible burden on the German worker. On the 
following day, delegate Reinhard Mumm, speaking on unemploy­
ment compensation, stated that "it must be emphasized again 
and again that the Versailles Diktat and soon perhaps the 
Dawes Plan as well represent a most difficult burden on our 
social policy: in fact, such a burden requires a struggle
for existence (Existenzkampf)."53
Delegate Emil Berndt, however, soon returned to the 
earlier line of argument. After admonishing the government 
for failing to clarify its position in London, he quickly
53G.P.D., vol. 381, 619.
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lapsed into a discussion of the "war guilt" question.54 
He emphasized the above-party nature of the struggle against 
the "war guilt lie" and stressed the significance of such a 
struggle for Germans. "Ladies and gentlemen, if we condone 
with our signature that part of the Dawes Plan [which states 
Germany's moral obligation to pay reparations], we will for 
the second time, and this time voluntarily, be condoning the 
German 'war guilt' lie."55
Professor of history and distinguished DNVP delegate 
Doctor Otto Hoetzsch delivered, on the twenty-sixth of July, 
the final delegation positional statement prior to the pre­
sentation of the draft legislation. His remarks were con­
sistent with the Party line as it had been presented previ­
ously during the debate. Referring to the Dawes proposals 
as a "second Versailles," Hoetzsch advised against an uncon­
ditional acceptance but did not preclude the possibility of 
further discussions based upon them. He attached, as 
Westarp had done on the fifth of June, conditions to DNVP 
acquiescence in future negotiations and noted that the Dawes 
Plan represented "not a binding agreement but only technical 
preliminary work . . . ."56
Hoetzsch's conditions were almost identical to those 
described earlier by Westarp. He demanded amnesty for 
political prisoners in the Rhine and Ruhr and the military
55G.P.D., vol. 381, 665.
55Ibid. , 740.
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evacuation of those areas. He stressed the need to end eco­
nomic sanctions in the occupied zones, to reestablish German 
economic sovereignty there, and to insure guarantees against 
future aggression. He demanded the evacuation of French and 
Belgian railway officials and the return of railway opera­
tions to German control.57 Hoetzsch emphasized that 
"for us these conditions are . . . conditio sine qua n o n . "58
Hoetzsch also returned to the relationship between the 
principles behind the Dawes proposals and the question of 
"war guilt." "It is obvious that any new obligations, any 
new regulation of the reparations question, cannot be car­
ried out with a repetition of the defamation associated with 
Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty."59 He demanded 
the immediate revocation of the "war guilt" clause.
While admitting that the Party was willing to make eco­
nomic sacrifices, Hoetzsch repeated his demand that the sine 
qua non conditions must be met. He emphasized that the 
delegation would remain firm in this attitude and would be 
willing to use its decisive votes in order to defeat 
attempts to the contrary. There was a limit beyond which 
German sacrifices could not be extended; above all, Germany 
must not sacrifice her national honor or sovereignty. He 
appealed to the government to "accept nothing [at the London
57See the G.P.D., vol. 381, 738-739.
S^Ibid.f 742. Italics in text.
59ibid., 741.
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Conference] that would be economically unbearable or con­
trary to the honor of the German Reich."60
Given the DNVP delegation's stated conditions upon 
which further discussion of the Dawes Committee's proposals 
should rest, the outcome of the London Conference repre­
sented a dismal failure. The French were to remain in the 
occupied zones, and the Dawes Plan was to be presented to 
parliament virtually unchanged from its original form. The 
Party press quickly took up the attack. On the seventeenth 
of August, for example, the Kreuz-Zeitung editorial column 
headline noted that Germany had, with the conclusion of the 
London Conference, undergone a "new capitulation." The 
political implications of the continuing French occupation 
of the Ruhr did not escape notice.
. . . Germany subjugated herself almost uncondi­
tionally to the Diktat of the opposite side. The 
fragile 'solution' did not provide for the chief 
goal of our efforts, the immediate liberation of 
the Ruhr from foreign pressure. The Ruhr remains 
under military occupation for another year . . .  .61
The editor went on to say that he expected "sharp oppo­
sition" in parliament to the Dawes Plan from the Volkischer 
parties. Considering Westarp's seven points discussed 
above, such opposition was easily predicted.
The evening edition on the twentieth of August pre­
sented a similar editorial argument. Anti-French and polit­
ical sentiments emerged in this editorial that revealed the
6 qG.P.D., vol. 381, 742. 
61r .Z ., 17 August, 1924.
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depth of nationalist disappointment with the results of the 
London Conference. The editor deplored the fact that the 
German delegation in London had failed to extract actual 
guarantees for the evacuation of the Rhine and Ruhr. He 
vehemently noted that France had forced the allied nations 
to acquiesce in the proposed extension of the period of 
occupation. France, he wrote, was the key to the failure to 
achieve acceptable results in London. "The French desire a 
postponed evacuation period . . . while then the politico- 
economic [handelspolitische] question following ratification 
[of the Dawes Plan] could be discussed with Germany —  under 
the pressure of French bayonets, which would then still 
remain in the R u h r ! " 6 2
Thus indignant editors, sympathetic to the DNVP posi­
tion, returned again and again to the basis of nationalist 
hostility toward the Dawes Committee proposals: the nation­
alists considered the continuing French occupation of German 
territory to be an affront to German sovereignty and a lever 
with which to force economic concessions from Germany that 
she could ill afford to make. Given this perception, it was 
but a short step to the perception that the Dawes Plan 
represented as well a threat to the economic sovereignty of 
Germany as a whole.
Doctor Karl Helfferich clearly expressed DNVP senti­
ments regarding the Dawes Plan's effect on German economic 
sovereignty:
6 2k .z. , 20 August, 1924.
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The system proposed by the [Dawes] experts, 
whose point is declared to be the saving of the 
German currency, is . . . the transference of the 
German economy into the hands of the reparations 
creditors, the organization of the infiltration 
of foreigners into the German economy from the 
inside o u t . 63
While national feelings played a role in determining 
Helfferich's attitude, the multitude of commissioners, 
trustees, and agents proposed by Dawes and his committee led 
invariably to such a conclusion. How, in fact, could the 
German economy operate in the best interests of the Volk 
when it was controlled by foreigners?
Helfferich was not alone in these sentiments. Time and 
again, DNVP delegates and Party press editors followed the 
lead of this prestigious Party member. For example, Doctor 
Reinhold G. Quaatz, Party delegate, complained that the 
economy, the Reichsbank, and the Reichsbahn had been "inter­
nationalized," and that these " . . .  instruments of economy 
and politics [had] been given into foreign h a n d s . "64
The DNVP perception that Germany, by accepting the 
results of the London Conference and the Dawes Plan, would 
be "selling out" her sovereign rights to "internationalism" 
lay behind the condemnations of government policy found in 
the pages of the Party press. On the twenty-first of August, 
the morning edition of the Kreuz-Zeitung contained a
63p . F.r Number 175, p. 9. 
64D . F . , Number 225, p. 14.
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scathing editorial relating directly to the German delega­
tion's actions in London. Doctor Friedrich Everling, DNVP 
parliamentary delegate and author of the article, ominously 
pointed to the moral responsibility of the government for 
the "defeat" suffered at the London Conference. Pointing 
to the present government's responsibility to the V o l k , 
Everling proceeded to pass judgment upon the London 
delegation:
The moral responsibility remains on those who 
brought home to the people defeat from London and 
still sought to call it a success. The historical 
responsibility will not permit itself to be shifted 
and in the history books one will read the judgment 
of those to whom we owe the 'Second Versailles'!65
The DNVP delegation's arguments, both in parliament and 
in the Party press, clearly reveal the delegates' attitudes 
toward both the Dawes Committee report and the subsequent 
Dawes Plan legislation. It is surprising to note that the 
delegation, made up primarily of conservatives and nation­
alists, was not opposed to the idea of having to pay repara­
tions. Their objections centered not on the fact of payment 
itself, but on the justification for such payment contained 
within the Dawes Committee report. While they accepted the 
fact that losing the war made Germany liable for economic 
concessions, they found no basis for obligations resting on 
moral responsibility and "war guilt." This underlying atti­
tude gave subjective overtones to many of their arguments 
during June and July. The delegates who spoke exhibited a
6 5K .Z ., 21 August, 1924.
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great concern for German honor rather than opposing concrete 
objections to the mechanics of the Dawes proposals.
In addition, the memory of Versailles was evident in 
their arguments. The DNVP delegates felt that the Dawes 
proposals might be imposed upon Germany unconditionally.
Thus they argued against unqualified acceptance, although 
they were willing to utilize the Dawes report as a basis for 
further discussion. They believed that Germany must be 
given the chance to participate in the determination of her 
economic and financial future as an equal. Hoetzsch1s 
reference to the Dawes proposals as a "second Versailles," 
however, indicated that the delegates expected the opposite 
to occur.
Another element in the DNVP delegation's attitude 
toward the Dawes proposals involved their perceptions of 
Franco-German relations. Especially evident in the Party 
press, these perceptions were in part subjective and in part 
practical. The delegates had argued throughout the passive 
resistance debate that the French occupation represented an 
outrage against German sovereignty. They feared that 
France, in order to end the German threat on her eastern 
frontier, was seeking to destroy Germany's economic poten­
tial and territorial unity. During the Dawes proposals 
debate, therefore, the DNVP delegates sought to establish 
conditions that would remove the French threat and insure 
against its recurrence. Hoetzsch's sine qua non conditions 
were based upon a belief in the French threat, as was the
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Party press's reaction to the results of the London 
Conference.
Thus on the eve of the coming parliamentary decision on 
the Dawes Plan, the DNVP delegation's position seemed to be 
intransigent. The delegation, as we have seen, held the 
balance in the voting and the Kreuz-Zeitung repeatedly 
pointed out that an outraged German sense of justice would 
prevail. But the delegates' attitudes were not as clear-cut 
as they appeared to be. In fact, the DNVP delegation's 
united stand against the Dawes Plan was soon to be shattered 
from within.
CHAPTER III
THE DEUTSCHNATIONALE VOLKSPARTEI AND THE DAWES PLAN:
THE VOTE
The final division on all Dawes legislation took place 
on the twenty-ninth of August, 1924. Forty-eight members of 
the DNVP delegation voted in favor of the Reichsbahn draft, 
giving it the required two-thirds majority and signalling 
acceptance of the Dawes Plan. Before discussing the delega­
tion's voting behavior, however, it is necessary to review 
briefly the circumstances surrounding the Party's formation 
in 1918.
The DNVP had grown up amid the ruins of the Second 
Reich during the catastrophic days of November, 1918, as a 
refuge for discredited Imperial right-wing parties and or­
ganizations; this association was a necessary expedient for 
political survival in the new Weimar Republic. The groups 
within the DNVP framework, however, maintained only a feder­
ated relationship; the individual elements retained their 
distinctive political views. They never desired to solidify 
into a unified party, and the result was only an amalgama­
tion of Conservatives, Free Conservatives, Christian Social­
ists, Agrarians, and P a n - G e r m a n s . 66
66These groups overlapped in some cases.
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While the delegation membership reflected these differ­
ent groups, the broader implications of the Dawes Plan tem­
porarily transcended in importance individual group priori­
ties. Thus the DNVP delegation as a whole was reacting to 
an economic plan unacceptable because of its moral implica­
tions, the threat that it posed to German economic and 
political sovereignty, and its implications for the tradi­
tional socio-economic structure of the German State. A new 
attitude, however, emerged within a portion of the delega­
tion between the twenty-seventh and the twenty-ninth of 
August, causing the affirmative vote during the final Dawes 
Plan division. The delegates' parliamentary arguments, pre­
sented above, reveal the basis for their negative reaction 
to the Dawes Plan; articles printed in selected Party publi­
cations reinforce this reaction but reveal as well the pri­
orities that ultimately shattered the delegation's united 
f ront.
The first hint of the possibility of a split vote is 
perceptible, however, when one considers the fundamental 
shift in the delegation's arguments during the final stages 
of the Dawes Plan debate. As the final division approached, 
the DNVP delegates advanced concrete economic arguments and 
demonstrated a concern for the social implications of the 
Dawes Plan rather than continuing to argue from the moral 
and legal base that they had utilized earlier.
On the twenty-sixth of August, for example, DNVP dele­
gate Doctor Paul Lejune-Jung spoke concerning the burden on
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industry proposed by the Dawes Plan. He not only found the 
imposition unrealistic, but the obligation of the "trustee" 
to mortgage or sell German industrial bonds on the interna­
tional market would subvert German industry to "internation­
al capital" by passing the control of German enterprises 
into the hands of foreign investors. Finally, Lejune-Jung 
noted that the heavy burdens on industry would hurt the 
German worker. He called for an unqualified rejection 
(Ablehnung) of the Dawes Plan legislation. 6*7
In addition, on the twenty-eighth, delegate Doctor 
Reinhold Georg Quaatz introduced new reasons for rejecting 
the proposed legislation:
1. The proposed taxation system would force the 
government to exploit the population in order 
to meet reparation obligations
2. Acceptance of the Dawes Plan would demonstrate 
national weakness (der Ausschaltung des 
nationalen Gedankens)
3. The railroad would pass into the hands of a 
foreign trustee68
Finally, Stettin's DNVP delegate Otto Schmidt presented 
the delegation's objections to the proposed changes in the 
German railroad. He especially emphasized the need to 
protect the rights of German civil servants employed by the 
railroad. For this reason, he argued, section 24 of the 
draft, concerning proposed personnel cutbacks, must be elim­
inated or at least amended in order to control its use.
67G .P.D., vol. 381, 913-915. 
68Ibid., 1003-1007.
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Thus the delegates perceived the Dawes legislation as a 
threat to Germany's economic sovereignty. The multitude of 
directors, commissioners, and trustees envisaged by the 
legislation did nothing to temper this perception, for, as 
noted in Chapter One, the Dawes Committee report clearly 
stated that foreign controls were necessary in order to 
overcome the "traditional" attitudes of the German business 
community. The final legislative drafts, virtually un­
changed from the original report, preserved intact these 
foreign controls.
The DNVP delegates' perceptions of the social implica­
tions of the Dawes Plan, however, are more complex. If one 
escapes for a moment from the traditional political scale, 
it is evident that the DNVP delegation was in fact somewhat 
socialist in temper. Government social action in Germany 
dated back to Bismarck's time; the DNVP delegates felt that 
the forces of Capitalism, freed from government control, 
would threaten the unity, well-being, and survival of the 
German Gemeinschaft. Foreign commissioners and investors, 
profit-oriented and influenced only by the laws of a free 
market, could have no concern for the welfare of the V o l k , 
who must inevitably suffer economically and psychologically 
from an individualistic and material socio-economic system; 
thus Lejune-Jung could argue on behalf of the German worker, 
and Quaatz on behalf of the threatened civil servant employ­
ed by the railroad. Quaatz himself clearly revealed these 
perceptions when he bitterly noted during the course of the
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debate: "Never since the time of the fallen Roman Empire
has a proud folk taken upon itself such a capitalistic sys­
tem of exploitation, especially of the lower classes of the 
people.”69
On Sunday, the thirtieth of August, 1924, the Kreuz- 
Zei tung morning edition screamed the following headline 
throughout Germany: "Final Acceptance of All Aspects of the
Dawes Plan!" The feature article speculated about the rea­
sons for the DNVP delegation's split vote and was obviously 
hostile to those delegtes who had voted "yes." It blamed 
the split vote on the government's offer to introduce DNVP 
delegates into the cabinet. "The turning-off of a part of 
the [DNVP] delegation to the 'Ja-Sagers' was initiated by 
the D V P 's offer of negotiations and finally accomplished by 
assurances of a 'Burgerblock' [ g o v e r n m e n t ] . " 7 0
The Kreuz-Zeitung, however, was not averse to printing 
as well the "Ja-Sagers" justifications for their decision. 
The "Ja-Sagers" based their reasoning primarily on two fun­
damental presuppositions. They believed that opposing the
69G.P.D., vol. 381, 1006.
7 qK . Z ., 30 August, 1924. Gustav Stresemann's Deutsche 
Volkspartei, the DVP, was a moderate right-of-center politi­
cal party that experienced extensive government participa­
tion during the Weimar years. It was this party that ap­
proached the DNVP with an offer of government participation 
prior to the Dawes Plan vote. Those pariiamentary delegates 
who opposed the Dawes Plan coined the derogatory term "Ja- 
Sagers" to label the opposite numbers who had "sold out." A 
Burgerblock government indicated a democratic yet moderately
nationalist coalition aimed at excluding extremism and 
placing the welfare of Germany above all individual faction 
interests•
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Dawes Plan would have proven fruitless, for the government
would have signed it anyway, dissolving parliament and hold­
ing new elections in order to achieve the necessary major­
ity. They also felt that by accepting the DVP offer of gov­
ernment participation, the DNVP could place itself in a 
position to moderate the Dawes Plan provisions following 
their implementation.
On the third of September, 1924, Otto Hoetzsch also de­
scribed the position taken by the "Ja-Sagers." In a well- 
reasoned editorial, he reiterated the justifications discus­
sed above and added a few of his own.
1. The Dawes Plan would bring the United States 
into European affairs, a vital ingredient for 
recovery and stability
2. The occupied areas would suffer further fol­
lowing a rejection of the Dawes Plan
3. Rejecting the Dawes Plan would lead to a prob­
able parliamentary dissolution, in which the 
DNVP representation might be weakened and that 
of the Left strengthened
4. The German economy would suffer far greater 
burdens than previously7!
A more accurate picture of the split vote, however, is 
gained by examining the official DNVP communication to the 
German people and the attitudes of DNVP "Nein-Sagers" toward 
DNVP "Ja-Sagers" rather than articles attempting to justify 
the voting behavior of each individual faction. The offi­
cial DNVP communication, for example, sought to assure the 
nation that a fatal split had not occurred within the ranks 
of the Party.
7 J-K . Z . , 30 August, 1924, morning edition.
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This communication, found within the pages of the 
Kreuz-Zeitung, consisted of four basic points:
1. The Party denied that a fundamental disagree­
ment in principles existed between the "Ja- 
Sagers" and the "Nein-Sagers"
2. The communication asserted that the split 
vote was solely [lediglich] a function of dif­
ferent evaluations of the situation by the two 
factions
3. All DNVP delegates were agreed that the Dawes 
Plan needed improvement and threatened to ini­
tiate a leftward course in German politics
4. Thus the "Nein-Sagers" based their decision on 
the unbearable nature of the Dawes Plan's eco­
nomic provisions and its overall unacceptabil­
ity, while the "Ja-Sagers" felt that their 
participation in the government could moderate 
the Dawes Plan's consequences72
Count Westarp's article in the evening edition of the 
Kreuz-Zeitung on the thirtieth of August, 1924, typifies the 
reasoning expressed in the official Party communication. In 
this article, he not only reiterated the Party position, but 
clarified his own attitude as well. He considered the 
"enslaving demands" of the Dawes Plan to outweigh the severe 
economic and political consequences of its rejection. Thus 
he was able to write that he, as an individual, had sought a 
unified negative vote from the DNVP delegation. In addi­
tion, however, he repeated the "Ja-Sagers" justifications 
for a positive vote and demonstrated his lack of hostility 
toward them. "I understand these goals, even if I did not 
follow that course. Now, however, it depends on all forces 
of the Party to come together for the common g o a l . "73
72K.Z. , 30 August, 1924.
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Thus the Party press revealed that the split vote was a 
function of differing evaluations of the future welfare of 
Germany rather than differing perceptions of the Dawes Plan 
itself. While all the DNVP delegates believed the Dawes 
Plan to be contrary to the principles of justice and an 
unacceptable solution to Germany's economic problems, some 
acted on the basis of this belief while others felt that 
Germany's burdens, moderated by DNVP government participa­
tion, would be lighter under the Dawes Plan than those that 
would follow its rejection.
Further evidence of this evaluational dichotomy is 
found in the pages of publications written by the DNVP dele­
gates themselves. Members of both the "Ja-Sager" and "Nein- 
Sager" factions of the Party authored books that touched 
upon the subject of the Dawes Plan and revealed their own 
particular evaluations of both the Plan and its implications 
for Germany's future.
One such publication, authored by delegation members 
Doctor Reinhold G. Quaatz and Doctor Martin Spahn, repeated 
the arguments that have appeared throughout this study time 
and a g a i n . Q u a a t z  and Spahn, describing the Dawes Plan 
as "a new dress for the old system of power," turned their 
attention to the Dawes Committee's assertion that Germany, 
having suffered no "noteworthy devastation" during the World
74Reinhold G. Quaatz and Martin Spahn, Germany 
under Military, Financial, and Economic Control (Berlin: 
Georg Stilke Press, 1925). Hereinafter referred to as 
G.u.M.F.a.E.C.
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War, had a moral obligation to those who had "suffered so 
severely."75
Their reply to this contention revealed the same basic 
perceptions that had emerged during the parliamentary de­
bates. They found complete continuity between the system 
established by the Treaty of Versailles and the system 
established by the Dawes Plan. This continuity rested upon 
the "war guilt lie." "The Dawes Plan therefore rests, 
exactly like the Treaty of Versailles, upon the assertion 
of German war guilt. This is its foundation."75 Because 
Quaatz and Spahn did not accept Germany's sole responsibil­
ity for the World War, they could not accept her moral obli­
gation to pay. In addition, the DNVP delegation had assert­
ed during the parliamentary debates that Germany had suffer­
ed material damage as a result of the War. Quaatz and Spahn 
could not fail to draw the conclusion that the Dawes Commit­
tee's basic presupposition mentioned above was false.
These authors also raised the issue, again following 
the arguments raised both during the parliamentary debates 
and in the Party press, of the French occupation. They 
found such occupation contrary to the Dawes Plan's promise 
to restore German economic and political sovereignty in the 
Rhine and Ruhr areas, as well as being detrimental to the 
future welfare of Germany as a whole. Quoting the chairmen
7 5G.u.M.F.a.E.C., p p • 80—81. 
75ibid., p. 81.
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of the German Chamber of Industry and Trade, the Reich Union 
of German Industry, and the Economic Committee for the Occu­
pied Areas, Quaatz and Spahn sought to drive these points 
home. "Especially the prerequisite of the re-establishment 
of Germany's economic and financial sovereignty remains un­
fulfilled. . . . We raise the sharpest opposition against 
the taking up of politico-economic discussions under the 
pressure of the occupation."77
Freiherrn von Freytagh-Loringhoven, a prominent member 
of the DNVP delegation, also broached the subject of the 
Dawes Plan in his work German National People's Party.78 
His discussion revealed his evaluation of the Dawes Plan 
controversy and his unique reason for adhering to the "Nein- 
Sagers" during the parliamentary vote.
Freytagh-Loringhoven concerned himself primarily with 
the reasons for the split vote. He began by attempting to 
explain the forces at work behind the development of a "Ja- 
Sager" attitude within the ranks of the Party. In addition 
to the argument, discussed above, that the so-called "middle 
parties" had held out the prize of participation in the gov­
ernment to the DNVP, he offered a further explanation:
77cha irmen of the German Chamber of Industry and Trade, 
the Reich Union of German Industry, and the Economic 
Committee for the Occupied Areas, quoted in G.u.M.F.a.E.C., 
pp. 83-84.
78preiherrn von Freytagh-Loringhoven, German National 
People's Party (Berlin: Pan-Verlagsgesellschaft M.B.H.,
1931)• Hereinafter referred to as D.N.V.P.
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. . . the economic circles, in spite of the sever­
ity of the burdens imposed upon us by the Dawes 
Plan, expected economic advantages from its imple­
mentation. They hoped that the Dawes Plan would 
revive the economy and feared that rejection would 
generate a scarcity of credit.79
These economic circles obviously enjoyed influence with the 
DNVP delegation, and Freytagh-Loringhoven evidently believed 
that they had been instrumental in creating the necessary 
block of DNVP affirmative votes for the Dawes Plan.
Freytagh-Loringhoven included the "Nein-Sagers" in his 
discussion as well. However, rather than emphasizing their 
belief in the unacceptability of the Dawes Plan and its 
moral injustices, he advanced another reason for their deci­
sion to reject it:
They represented the view that the national 
Right could not permit itself to become guilty of 
the voluntary enslavement of Germany, and that the 
trust of the voters, who had given the Party its 
voice [during the May elections] on the basis of a 
campaign slogan of rejection could not be permitted 
to be deceived.80
Loyalty to the voting public was an argument seldom ad­
vanced on behalf of the "Nein-Sagers." It seems probable in 
this case that although Freytagh-Loringhoven1s basic atti­
tudes toward the Dawes Plan did not differ substantially 
from those of his fellow delegates, his priorities ran along 
the traditional line of honoring a pledge made to the voters
79D.N.V.P., p. 24. Freytagh-Loringhoven1s economic 
circles, while remaining anonymous, cannot have been those 
organizations quoted by Quaatz and Spahn above. This demon­
strates clearly that different evaluations of Germany's 
future welfare existed outside the political sphere as well.
8QIbid., p. 25.
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during the election campaign the previous May. In addition, 
Freytagh-Loringhoven could hardly have failed to equate the 
future well-being of Germany with a strong nationalist and 
Conservative representation in parliament. A loss of confi­
dence in the DNVP among its public supporters, triggered by 
the failure to adhere to a campaign promise, could seriously 
weaken the DNVP position at the polls.
Doctor Otto Hoetzsch also provided testimony regarding 
the DNVP and the Dawes Plan. In his work The World Politi­
cal Division of Power, Doctor Hoetzsch touched briefly upon 
the subject of the Dawes Plan within the greater context of 
the Treaty of Versailles.81
Hoetzsch, of course, dismissed the Treaty of Versailles 
as an unworkable solution to Europe*s problems following the 
World War. Continuing on to the Dawes Plan, however, he 
discussed it from the point of view of an academician rather 
rather than that of a German nationalist.82 This detachment 
led him to state, in seeming contradiction to his parliamen­
tary remarks prior to the Dawes Plan vote, that the Plan 
"released" the question of reparations from political 
motives:
It placed [the Dawes Plan] upon a rational founda­
tion of pure economic and financial estimations 
and obligations . . . .  With it Germany submitted, 
in a financial sense, voluntarily in the new system
blotto Hoetzsch, The World Political Division of Power 
(Berlin: The Central Press, 1928). Hereinafter referred to
as W.P.K.V.
82See W.P.K.V., pp. 32-33.
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of power in the West, as it had been conceived in 
1919, in order to save itself before it totally 
collapsed and to find, in cooperation with North 
America, the road to economic r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , 83
He was, however, quick to contrast the results of the 
Dawes Plan's implementation with its idealistic aims. "The 
[Dawes] Plan is not a complete liquidation of the financial 
results of the War."84 It is interesting to note here that 
Hoetzsch did not restrict his evaluation of the results of 
the Dawes Plan to Germany alone, as had so many other DNVP 
delegates. Instead, he led his discussion along general 
European lines, giving the Dawes Plan credit for being an 
honest, albeit only partially successful, attempt at solving 
a difficult financial problem.
Given Hoetzsch's expanded view as a historian, this 
approach is easily understood, especially when one considers 
that he was writing with the detached reason of a historian 
and also after the event had occurred. Thus the contradic­
tion between his fiery remarks in parliament and his cool 
detachment three years later is resolved, especially when 
one remembers that even prior to the Dawes Plan vote, as 
noted in Chapter Two above, Hoetzsch had not completely dis­
missed the Dawes proposals as unworkable.
A member of the "Ja-Sager" faction of the DNVP,
Hoetzsch evidently found Germany's future well-being to lie 
within an economically and politically stable greater Europe.
83see W.P.K.V., pp. 32-33. 
84Ibid., p. 33.
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Accepting the Dawes Plan represented, in his opinion, the 
first step toward achieving this condition.
One final DNVP delegate deserves mention during this 
discussion of Party publications dealing with the Dawes 
Plan. Alfred Hugenberg, a noted press magnate, was not 
present during the final vote on the twenty-ninth of August, 
due to illness, but his letter to delegation leader Hergt on 
the eve of the vote reveals yet another evaluation of the 
stance which Germany would have to assume in order to assure 
her future well-being.
Hugenberg's letter to Hergt advanced two reasons for 
rejecting the Dawes Plan. In the first place, Hugenberg 
warned Hergt that only by rejecting the Dawes Plan in its 
current form could the foundation be laid for negotiating 
more favorable conditions later. ". . . [T]he only path
toward improving the fundamental basis of negotiations 
[Verhandlungsgrundlagen] today, that is, after the failure 
of the present administration [in London], exists in the 
rejection of the London Agreement."^
In the second place, he indicated as well that he based 
his demand for rejecting the Dawes Plan on his feelings as a 
German and his refusal to accept the moral degradation and 
enslavement of his Germany and her future that voting "yes" 
on the Dawes Plan legislation implied:
^^Alfred Hugenberg, Highlights From the Past and 
Present (Berlin: A. Scherl, 1927), p. 97.
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The second reason consists of the fact that 
in the future, the pernicious idea must not become 
standard among the foreign parties concerned [with 
the Dawes Plan] that more than two-thirds of the 
German people, including as well those circles sup­
porting the DNVP, are inwardly prepared to permit 
the sale of their nation's freedom, honor and future 
in the hope of a few pieces of s i l v e r . 8 6
The reference to the Biblical story of Judas is clear. 
Hugenberg believed that accepting the Dawes Plan represented 
his nation's willingness to deliver their Germany into the 
hands of the enemy in return for financial concessions. In
his opinion, such an act would auger ill for the future
well-being of the German State.
Thus, in print, the DNVP delegates and their sympathiz­
ers revealed the same basic attitudes that had motivated 
their arguments during the debates prior to the final vote.
The differing evaluations concerning the best path to
Germany's future well-being, however, that led to the split 
vote, become clear in the various Party publications that we 
have examined here. While the basic attitudes of all dele­
gation members were similar, some felt that future German 
well-being lay in accepting the Dawes Plan as a negotiable 
first step toward vitally necessary economic recovery.
Others felt that Germany must uphold her national honor 
before the community of nations if her future well-being 
were to be assured. In the final analysis, it rested with
^ A l f r e d  Hugenberg, Highlights from the Past and 
Present (Berlin: A. Scherl, 1927), p. 97.
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each delegate to select the evaluation, for whatever reason, 
that must dictate his decision on the twenty-ninth of 
August.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
Once the historian has ascertained, assembled, and 
reported the facts, his second and more difficult task is at 
hand. He must study, analyze, and draw conclusions from 
them that validate the entire research project. In the case 
of the DNVP and the Dawes Plan, drawing such conclusions 
represents a serious challenge. The course of the parlia­
mentary debate and the subsequent split vote on the twenty- 
ninth of August refute the seemingly obvious prediction that 
the DNVP delegation would express a uniform negative reac­
tion to the Dawes Plan. Thus what should have been an 
easily predicted negative response turns out to be a com­
plex reaction superimposed upon a uniform set of basic pre­
suppositions. Even though their final responses to the 
Dawes Plan varied, the DNVP delegates were motivated by a 
common attitude based on these presuppositions.
The DNVP delegation's belief that Article 231 of the 
Treaty of Versailles, the "war guilt" clause, formed the 
political justification for the Dawes Plan emerges again and 
again, both in the parliamentary debates and in the publish­
ed literature that we have examined in the previous chapter. 
As long as the Dawes experts justified their proposals on
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basis of Germany's moral responsibility to pay, that is, on 
Germany's "war guilt," they could be assured of the enmity 
of the DNVP delegation as a whole. Such hostile feelings 
easily overrode any immediate favorable response based on 
the economic advantages of the Dawes Plan. The DNVP delega­
tion perceived in the Dawes Plan a continued imposition of 
the system of humiliation and subjection established at 
Versailles and founded on a lie, a heightening of the 
Versklavung of the Piktat. This basic presupposition re­
mained common to all members of the DNVP delegation both 
during the course of the debate and during and after the 
split vote.
In addition, the DNVP delegation members shared a com­
mon perception of the role of the French in the forging of 
the Dawes Plan. They believed the French to be a harsh and 
manipulative enemy behind the scenes, seeking to prolong the 
Versailles system and to destroy Germany as a force in 
Europe. This perception had long historical roots and was 
to be expected from German politicians schooled in the days 
of the Empire and the World War. Thus the DNVP delegation 
perceived France as a hostile force and, by logical exten­
sion, the Dawes Plan, especially when they considered the 
continuing presence of "French bayonets" in the Rhine and 
Ruhr, as an instrument of French policy.
One final perception shared by the DNVP delegates also 
warrants our consideration, for it explains in part the 
split vote on the twenty-ninth of August. Both the
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delegates* explanations for the split vote and their argu­
ments during the course of the parliamentary debates indi­
cate that they shared a common concern for the future well­
being of Germany. Thus the DNVP "Nein-Sagers" and "Ja- 
Sagers" based their respective decisions on the Dawes Plan 
on their own evaluations of the best way to insure Germany's 
future.
The "Nein-Sagers" believed that Germany's future well­
being depended upon her ability to stand fast in the face of 
a wrongly imposed international injustice and to preserve 
the moral integrity of the German nation. Only then could 
she obtain her rightful position in the world community of 
nations. Thus the "Nein-Sagers" could not accept the Dawes 
Plan either in principle or in practice. The "Ja-Sagers," 
on the other hand, while rejecting the Dawes Plan in princi­
ple, saw it as a basis for German economic recovery, essen­
tial to Germany's future well-being, and as a vehicle for 
their entrance into the government, where they could exert 
influence over Germany's future course. They believed that 
rejecting the Dawes Plan would destroy Germany's chances for 
obtaining a stable and leading position in the international 
community of nations. Thus, while the "Ja-Sagers" rejected 
the Dawes Plan in principle, they found the key to Germany's 
future well-being in accepting it in practice.
A shared Party goal, therefore, contributed to the 
split vote on the Dawes Plan. The reason for the DNVP dele­
gation's response on the twenty-ninth of August, however.
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was not limited to the delegates' concern for Germany's 
future welfare. The nature of the Party itself contributed 
as well to the DNVP delegation's inability to take a united 
stand.
The DNVP was formed as a matter of expediency and 
political survival in an atmosphere of turmoil and drew to­
gether disparate elements from the various discredited par­
ties of the vanquished Second Reich. It is possible to gen­
eralize about its political persuasion, to say that it was a 
"conservative, right-wing, and nationalist" Party, but to 
utilize such terms of convenience ignores the essential fact 
of its internal divisions. These internal divisions also 
explain in part the split vote on the Dawes Plan. Factional 
priorities, whether social, political, or economic, influ­
enced the outcome of the DNVP vote. Thus one must see the 
DNVP delegates both as Party members and as members of the 
individual factions within the Party. Only then does the 
delegation's response to the Dawes Plan on the twenty-ninth 
of August become truly understandable.
Thus the DNVP delegates perceived, each in his own way, 
that their decision to accept or reject the Dawes Plan was 
in keeping with the best interests of Germany. The history, 
however, of the remaining years of the Weimar Republic 
clearly demonstrates the serious situation that developed as 
a result of the split in Germany's strongest conservative 
party.
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The implementation of the Dawes Plan and the subsequent 
signing of the Locarno Treaty in 1925 ushered in what has 
subsequently become known as the "era of good feeling." 
Within Germany, however, ominous signs indicated that the 
"era of good feeling" was superficial at best, if not non­
existent. Given the nature of the Dawes Plan, its implica­
tions of "war guilt" and distrust, and the continuing growth 
of Socialist and Communist strength at the polls, a nation­
alist political reaction was inevitable. Nationalist Paul 
von Hindenburg's election as President of the Weimar Repub­
lic in 1925 and the growth of Nazism as a political force in 
the late nineteen-twenties were both strong indicators of 
this reaction. Increasing German hostility and chauvinism 
contradicted the goals of European stability and peace im­
plied by the "era of good feeling." Even the DNVP fell 
under the nationalist spell; with the emergence of press 
magnate Alfred Hugenberg as Party leader in the last part of 
the decade, the Party moved closer to the extremist camp.
Perhaps a strong conservative party could have averted 
the rise of Nazism as the dominant political force in 
Germany. The DNVP, however, unable to unite on the Dawes 
Plan issue, revealed its inability to maintain a moderate 
nationalist course in German government, a course which 
might have satisfied German honor and integrated with rather 
than collided with the course of the Western European com­
munity. Such a course might have provided the strong 
national leadership necessary in a time of uncertainty and
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enabled Germany to find a compromise solution to her post­
war problems. The split vote on the twenty-ninth of August, 
however, revealed the D N V P 1s inability to unite on critical 
issues, costing them the confidence of the voting public as 
well as the chance to make this fundamental contribution to 
Germany's future welfare. Ironically, as we have seen, the 
desire to make such a contribution had been one of the basic 
reasons for the split vote.
The DNVP delegation's response to the Dawes Plan is 
also indicative of the role of perceptions in the shaping of 
history. The Dawes Committee perceived their task as in­
volving two aspects: not only did they have to find a solu­
tion palatable to the Germans, but they also had to satisfy 
the "victor nations," and, as we know, France was particu­
larly intransigent in its attitude toward the reparations 
issue. In addition, it is difficult to see how the Dawes 
Committee itself could have remained unaffected by the 
"Versailles mentality" that marked the Allied governments 
following the conclusion of the World War. The moral justi­
fication contained in the committee report, the measures for 
economic controls, perhaps inspired by a basic distrust of 
Germany's willingness to pay reparations, and the failure to 
alleviate the situation in the Rhine and Ruhr all indicate 
that the Dawes Plan was in part shaped by a deep-seated 
feeling of hostility toward Germany, a belief in her respon­
sibility for the World War.
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Thus, unfortunately, the DNVP delegation and the Dawes 
Committee members were working at cross-purposes. The DNVP 
delegates perceived the French as a hostile and intractable 
power, while the Dawes Committee perceived them as a neces­
sary partner to be satisfied if the Dawes Plan was to have 
any chance of success. The DNVP delegates perceived the 
economic controls of the Dawes Plan as an infringement on 
German sovereignty, while the Dawes Committee perceived them 
to be a necessary part of the machinery to insure repara­
tions payments. The DNVP delegates rejected Germany's moral 
responsibility to pay, while the Dawes Committee, deliberat­
ing in the post-Versailles atmosphere, considered this a 
logical justification for Germany's reparations obligations. 
It is therefore difficult to see how any lasting solution to 
Europe's problem of instability could have been achieved.
As history has proven, the respite from war was short-lived.
One wonders if any human being would have been capable 
of satisfying all the conflicting perceptions discussed 
above in the atmosphere of post-war Europe. In any event, 
one must agree with the DNVP delegation's evaluation: the
Dawes Plan represented a basis, and a basis only, for pro­
gressing toward a workable solution to Germany's, and, in 
the long run, Europe's problems. But does the historian, 
blessed with the advantage of hindsight, have the right to 
conclude that men, trapped within the limitation of the 
moment, are capable of escaping their perceptions of the 
moment? I think not, and the results of the Dawes Plan,
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coupled with the subsequent course of German history, seems 
to support this conclusion.
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